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COMMENTS
Privacy, Appropriation, and the First Amendment:
A Human Cannonball's Rather Rough Landing
It should be obvious at once that these four types of invasion may be subject, in some respects a t least, to different rules;
and that when what is said as to any one of them is carried over
to another, it may not be a t all applicable, and confusion may
follow .'

When Dean Prosser first delineated his by-now-famous four
categories of invasion of p r i ~ a c yhe
, ~ was careful to add the above
caveat. A plaintiff complaining of appropriation of his name or
likeness might well be asserting completely different interests
than a plaintiff seeking redress for public disclosure of private
facts. Distinct differences also exist between the other categories,
intrusion upon physical solitude or seclusion and publicity placing the plaintiff in a false light. If these varying interests and
differences are not recognized, confusion could well follow.
And Hugo Zacchini, for one, has no doubt that confusion
indeed did follow.
Mr. Zacchini occupies a rather special niche in the entertainment field, that of a human cannonball. He allows himself to' be
hurtled from the mouth of a cannon into a net some 200 feet away
to the awe of onlookers a t county fairs and other places of amusement.3 On August 30, 1972, Zacchini was performing his feat a t
the Geauga County Fair in Burton, Ohio. Also present that day
was a reporter for the Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Company,
operator of television station WEWS in Cleveland. The reporter
was carrying a small movie camera. Zacchini noticed the reporter
1. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF.
L. REV. 383, 389 (1960) (emphasis added).
2. Prosser delineated these categories as:
1. Intrusion upon the plaintiffs seclusion or solitude, or into his private
affairs.
2. Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff.
3. Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye.
4. Appropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of the plaintiffs name or
likeness.

Id.
3. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 97 S. Ct. 2849, 2851 (1977).
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and requested that his act not be filmed.' The reporter responded
that Zacchini had no right to restrict filming of a newsworthy
event.Wver Zacchini's express objection, the act was filmed the
following day and presented as a 15-second segment of the station's 11 o'clock news program. Zacchini then filed a lawsuit,
charging that use of the film clip constituted an "unlawful appropriation of his professional property."The trial court granted the
defendant's motion for summary judgment,' and Zacchini undauntedly petitioned the Ohio Eighth District Court of AppeaW
It was at that point that the labels attached to the case were
first tossed into the air9-terms such as "privacy," "right of publicity," and, ominously, "Time, Inc. u. Hill."lo And not until the
United States Supreme Court handed down Zacchini u. ScrippsHoward Broadcasting Co. l1 on June 28, 1977 was anyone quite
sure just which labels stuck where.
This Comment will detail briefly the origins of what is
lumped together in the law of torts as the "right of privacy."
Next, the emergence of the "right of publicity," an offshoot of one
of Presser's four branches of privacy-appropriation of the plaintiff's name or likeness-will be given special attention. This right,
protecting a celebrity's proprietary interest in his personality, has
been recognized by a growing number of jurisdictions.12 As this
Comment will show, however, jurisdictions adopting the new tort
unfortunately have not always succeeded in clearly separating it
as a distinct branch of the privacy rubric. For example, the first
amendment privilege attached by the Supreme Court in Time,
Inc. v. HiW3 to "false light" privacy cases,*' has been applied
4. Id.
5. Brief for Petitioner at 4, Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 97 S. Ct.
2849 (1977).
6. Id. at 3.
7. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 97 S. Ct. at 2851.
8. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., No. 33,713, slip op. (Ohio Ct. App.,
July 10, 1975), reu'd, 47 Ohio St. 2d 224, 351 N.E.2d 454 (1976), rev'd, 97 S. Ct. 2851
(1977).
9. As the trial court did not issue an opinion, its treatment of the privacy, right of
publicity, and first amendment issues in the case is unknown. Brief for Petitioner at 4.
10. 385 U.S. 374 (1967); see notes 75-84 and accompanying text infra.
11. 97 S. Ct. 2851 (1977).
12. Note, The Right of Publicity-Protection for Public Figures and Celebrities, 42
L. REV.527 (1976).
BROOKLYN
13. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
14. Hill held that publication of a matter of "public interest" was privileged by the
first amendment "in the absence of proof that the defendant published the report with
knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of the truth." Id. at 387-88.
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indiscriminately by many courts to appropriation privacy cases.15
Clarification of this confusion, which when unresolved often led
to absurd results,16is the focus of this discussion.
This Comment follows the somewhat tortuous path travelled
by the courts in Zucchini. The case began as a seemingly simple
appropriation privacy case, underwent without major difficulty a
transformation into a right of publicity case," and then ran headon into false light privacy's first amendment privilege-hardly a
case history of orderliness. In light of this confusion, it is ironic
to note that in 1974 two legal scholars wrote, "If there is certainty
in any area of privacy law, it is in the area of appropriation."18

A. Origins of the Right of Privacy
The state of privacy law has been described as that of a
"haystack in a hurricane."lVhatever its present state, however,
it is generally agreed that the right of privacy had its genesis with
perhaps the most influential of all law review articles,z0The Right
to Privacy,z1written by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis in
1890. The topic has since been the subject of innumerable law
review articlesz2and a burgeoning number of cases.z3
The common law in its "eternal
was called upon by
-

15. See notes 75-101 and accompanying text infra.
16. See notes 94-101 and accompanying text infra.
17. Several courts have noticed inherent differences between privacy theory and the
interests protected by the right of publicity. Some propose that the right of publicity be
recognized as an independent tort:
Although misappropriation of one's name, likeness or personality for commercial use has been considered as one species of the general tort of invasion of
privacy, many authorities suggest that misappropriation is a distinctly independent tort. The reasoning behind this approach is that Presser's first three categories involve the incidence of specific personal harm (i.e., injury to feelings),
while the fourth is generally considered to involve a pecuniary loss, an interference with property.
Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277, 1279-80 (D. Minn. 1970) (footnote omitted);
see also Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836, 843 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Grant
v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876, 879-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Hogan v. A.S. Barnes & Co.,
114 U.S.P.Q. 314, 315-16 (Pa. C.P. 1957).
18. Pember & Teeter, Privacy and the Press Since Time, Inc. v. Hill, 50 WASH.
L.
REV. 57, 87 (1974).
19. Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481, 485 (3d Cir. 1956).
20. Prosser, supra note 1, a t 383.
21. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Hmv. L. REV. 193 (1890).
22. Prosser, supra note 1, a t 384 & n.6.
23. Id. at 386-89.
24. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 21, a t 193.

582

BXIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[1977:

Warren and Brandeis to secure to the individual the right to be
"let alone."25They stated that while there were superficial resemblances between common law actions for libel and slander
and their espoused "right of privacy," defamation protected
"material" interests, while the rights protected by the law of
This "material-spiritual" dichotomy
privacy were "~piritual."~~
led one critic to charge that the right of privacy may be merely a
petty offspring of prissy Victorian morality.27
Whatever the foundation of the right, it was rejected in 1902
by the first court to consider a distinct privacy action. In
~ ~ New York Court of
Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box C O . ,the
Appeals was confronted with a complaint that use of the plaintiffs picture on the defendant's box of flour without her consent
invaded her right to privacy. The court, noting that recognition
of any such right was the job of the legislature, denied recovery.2g
The New York legislature reacted one year later by enacting sections 50 and 51 of the New York Civil Rights Law, dealing specifically with the right of privacy.30This statute, fundamental to
many cases considered later in this comment,31provided relief for
appropriation of a person's name or likeness for advertising or
purposes of trade.
Warren and Brandeis' new tort was received more warmly in
Georgia. On facts quite similar to those in the Roberson case, that
state's supreme court held in 1905 that, within constitutional
limits of free speech and press, one has the right to be free from
unwanted publicity and that use of one's picture in an advertisment without consent violates the right .32 Thus, Pavesich v. New
25. Id. a t 195.
26. Id. a t 197.
27. Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law- Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW&
CONTEMP.
PROB.326, 329 (1966).
28. 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902).
29. Id. a t 545, 64 N.E. at 443.
30. N.Y. CIV.RIGHTS
LAW$9 50-51 (McKinney 1976). Following New York's lead, four
other jurisdictions have passed similar statutes. Of the five appropriation statutes, four
are essentially identical and make appropriation of the name, picture, or portrait of
another "for the purpose of advertising" or "for trade purposes" a misdemeanor and the
basis of a right of action for damages. Id.; OKLA.STAT.ANN. tit. 21, § § 839.1-.2 (West
Supp. 1976); UTAHCODEANN. $4 76-9-405 to 406 (1953); VA. CODE§ 8-650 (1950). The
major distinction between the four statutes is that under the New York law the right of
action is restricted to "any living person" whose name, picture, or portrait is appropriated
for commercial use. In the Oklahoma, Utah, and Virginia statutes, the right of action
survives the person whose name or likeness is appropriated. The major distinction of the
California appropriation statute, CAL.CIV. CODE§ 3344 (West Supp. 1977), is that it
contains no penal provision.
31. See notes 85-107 and accompanying text infra.
32. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190,220,50 S.E. 68,80-81(1905).
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England Life Insurance Co. became the leading case in the area
of privacy .33
It is apparent that the early privacy cases and statutes were
mixing two arguably discrete ideas: Warren and Brandeis' classical right to be "let alone," and unauthorized appropriation of
personality to secure a profit for the a p p r o p r i a t ~ r Failure
.~~
to
recognize fundamental differences inherent in these two ideas
contributed to confusion complicating later cases35and ultimately Zacchini.
An important exception engrafted upon the right of privacy
by Warren and Brandeis and thereafter accepted by the courts36
was that "[tlhe right to privacy does not prohibit any publication of matter which is of public or general intere~t."~'
Warren
and Brandeis observed that:
[tlhe general object in view is to protect the privacy of
private life, and to whatever degree and in whatever connection
a man's life has ceased to be private, before the publication
under consideration has been made, to that extent the protection is to be w i t h d r a ~ n . ~ ~

Development of the law of privacy was rapid.3gBy the time
Dean Prosser wrote his article entitled Privacy40 in 1960, he asserted there were well over 300 privacy cases on the books.41These
cases, moreover, could be classified into four distinct categories
"which are tied together by the common name, but otherwise
have almost nothing in common."42 These four categories, as
mentioned earlier, include: (1) intrusion upon the plaintiffs
physical solitude or seclusion, (2) public disclosure of private
facts, (3) publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the
public eye, and (4) appropriation of the plaintiffs name or likeness for the defendant's benefit or advantage. Prosser, in spite of
33. Gordon, Right of Property in Name, Likeness, Personality and History, 55 Nw.

U.L. REV.553, 558-59 (1960).
34. Kalven, supra note 27, at 331.
35. See, e.g., O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 315
U.S. 823 (1941); Man v. Warner Bros. Inc., 317 F. Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Gautier v.
Pro-Football, Inc., 304 N.Y. 354, 107 N.E.2d 485 (1952).
36. See, e.g., Afro-American Publishing Co. v. Jaffe, 366 F.2d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1966);
Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711 (1940).
37. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 21, at 214.
38. Id. at 215 (footnote omitted).
39. For a list of states and cases recognizing the right of privacy, see Prosser, supra
note 1, at 386-88.
40. Prosser, supra note 1.
41. Id. at 388.
42. Id. at 389.
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a careful warning that principles applicable to one branch of the
tort may not apply to another and directly after the statement
above that they have almost nothing in common, perhaps unfortunately added, "except that each represents an interference with
the right of the plaintiff . . . 'to be let alone'."43

B. Right of Publicity: Protecting the Nonprivate Person
As courts were soon to discover, many privacy cases involving
appropriation of the plaintiffs name or likeness did not involve
the right to be "let alone," but rather the right to be paid for
being "bothered."
One of the first celebrities to invoke privacy theory to redress
unprivileged use of his name and likeness was Thomas Edison.
In Edison u. Edison Polyform Manufacturing Co. ,44plaintiff Edison sought an injunction against the use of his name and likeness
on bottles of the defendant's medicinal preparation. The court,
holding for Edison, vindicated his proprietary interest in his
name and likeness:
If a man's name be his own property, as no less an authority
than the United States Supreme Court says it is . . . it is difficult to understand why the peculiar cast of one's features is not
also one's property, and why its pecuniary value, if it has one,
does not belong to its owner, rather than to the person seeking
to make an unauthorized use of it.45

Apparently without much difficulty, the court classified appropriation of this property interest as an invasion of privacy.46 But
the shoals of privacy theory, hidden in the semantic baggage of
the word privacy, soon became apparent when the theory was
invoked by other celebrities.
In O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co. ,47 the plaintiff was a wellknown collegiate football star whose photograph had been taken
and circulated by the university's publicity department. Defendant Pabst used the photo on a calender advertising its beer.48
The plaintiff had turned down a similar offer from another beer
e
company that had offered $400 for use of his p h ~ t o . ~ T hcourt
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id.
73 N.J. Eq. 136, 67 A. 392 (Ch. 1907).
Id. at 141, 67 A. at 394.
Id.
124 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 315 U.S.823 (1941).
Id. at 168.
Id. at 170 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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refused relief, holding that by becoming a famous personality the
plaintiff had in a sense "waived" his right to privacy:
Assuming then, what is by no means clear, that an action
for right of privacy would lie in Texas at the suit of a private
person, we think it clear that the action fails; because plaintiff
is not such a person and the publicity he got was only that which
he had been constantly seeking and receiving; . . . and there
were no statements or representations made in connection with
it, which were or could be either false, erroneous or damaging
to plaintiff.50

In contrast to the Edison court, the O'Brien court, blinded
by the word "privacy," had failed to see that what the plaintiff
was seeking to redress was appropriation of a proprietary interest.
Judge Edwin R. Holmes in his dissent, however, saw through the
privacy label to what was actually at issue. The right to receive
a royalty, not be left alone, was what plaintiff sought:
The right of privacy is distinct from the right to use one's
name or picture for purposes of commercial advertisement. The
latter is a property right that belongs to every one; it may have
much or little, or only a nominal value; but it is a personal right,
which may not be violated with impunity.51

In addition to imputed waiver of privacy, other problems
confronted the public figure who sought redress under privacy
theory for appropriation of his personality. As a personal right,
privacy was deemed to be n~nassignable.~~
As such, a person did
not sell a license to use his name or picture, but merely made a
promise not to bring suit for invasion of privacys3-a suit which,
if the person was a public figure, would in many jurisdictions
probably be ineffective anyway. In addition to being nonassignable, the right was not descendible-it expired with the celebrity,
and a surviving spouse could not redress even blatant appropriation of per~onality.~~
As long as appropriation was fixedly catego50. Id. (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
51. Id. (Holmes, J., dissenting).
PROB.203, 209 (1954).
52. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP.
53. See, e.g., Hanna Mfg. Co. v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 78 F.2d 763 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 296 U.S. 645 (1935).
54. Miller v. Universal Pictures Co., 201 N.Y.S.2d 632 (Sup. Ct. 1960), aff'd, 10
N.Y.2d 9'72, 180 N.E.2d 248,224 N.Y.S.2d 662 (1961); see also Price v. Hal Roach Studios,
Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). In Price, the court observed:
Since the theoretical basis for the classic right of privacy, and of the statutory right in New York, is to prevent injury to feelings, death is a logical conclusion to any such claim. In addition, based upon the same theoretical foundation,
such a right of privacy is not assignable during life.
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rized as usurpation of a privacy instead of a propriety interest,
courts would often turn their heads, for one reason or another,
when celebrities sought relief. The animal trainer, who performed
during halftime of a football game and discovered that his act had
been broadcast without his consent and contrary to his contract,
was dismissed with the observation that as he was already performing before a large crowd, he had no privacy to assert.55
The situation was not to go unremedied. In 1953, the Second
Circuit first coined the phrase "right of publicity" to deal with
appropriation of a celebrity's personality. The case, Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum,Inc. ,56involved the right to
use a ballplayer's photograph on chewing gum cards. The plaintiff had made a contract with an athlete for the exclusive right
to his picture for a stated time. The defendant, a rival chewing
gum company, deliberately induced the player to authorize its
use of his picture. The defendant, arguing classical privacy
theory, asserted that the athlete's contract with the plaintiff was
no more than a release, without which the plaintiff would be
liable under the New York privacy statute for use of the photograph." The court rejected this reasoning:
We think that, i n addition to and independent of that right of
privacy (which in New York derives from statute), a man has a
right in the publicity value of his photograph, i.e., the right to
grant the exclusive privilege of publishing his picture . . . .
Whether it be labelled a "property" right is immaterial; for
here, as often elsewhere, the tag "property" simply symbolizes
the fact that courts enforce a claim which has pecuniary worth.
This right might be called a "right of publicity." For it is
common knowledge that many prominent persons (especially
actors and ball-players), far from having their feelings bruised
through public exposure of their likenesses, would feel sorely
deprived if they no longer received money for authorizing advertisements . . . . This right of publicity would usually yield
them no money unless it could be made the subject of an exclusive grant which barred any other advertiser from using their

Id. at 844 (footnote omitted). The court, however, rejected such reasoning, holding that
as the right of publicity was a "property right," it was freely assignable and descendible.
Id.
55. Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc., 304 N.Y.354, 107 N.E.2d 485 (1952).
56. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953).
57. Id. at 868.
58. Id. (emphasis added). But see Hanna Mfg. Co. v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 78
F.2d 763, 766 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 645 (1935) (personality's interest in his
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Thus, because appropriation of a celebrity's personality involved considerations distinct from appropriation of a private
person's personality, the appropriation branch of privacy law had
sprouted its own limb. While appropriation of a private person's
picture may involve, as Prosser noted when he first devised the
category, intrusion on that plaintiffs right to be "let alone,"59
appropriation of the celebrity's personality involved a pecuniary
loss to the celebrity-an interference with a proprietary interest .60
The quite-different considerations involved in appropriation of a
private person's personality and appropriation of a celebrity's
personality raise the question of whether it might not be better
to completely sever this new limb from appropriation privacy
theory altogether.
In view of the argument made by the court in Haelan, it may
even be questionable whether Warren and Brandeis would place
the appropriation of a celebrity's personality under the privacy
rubric. In their article, they made a rather detailed analysis of the
common law protection given literary property, often noted as
common law copyright." From this analysis they extrapolated a
common law protection, i. e., privacy, for forms of expression that
formerly could not be readily placed under the common law literary property rules. In the course of this discussion they noted
where the recognized common law rules do not extend and where
the right of privacy begins:
What is the nature, the basis, of this right to prevent the
publication of manuscripts or works of art? It is stated to be the
enforcement of a right of property; and no difficulty arises in
accepting this view, so long as we have only to deal with the
reproduction of literary and artistic compositions. They certainly possess many of the attributes of ordinary property: they
are transferable; they have a value; and publication or reproduction is a use by which that value is realized. But where the
value of the production is found not in the right to take the
profits arising from publication, but in the peace of mind or the
relief afforded by the ability to prevent any publication at all,
it is difficult to regard the right as one of property, in the common acceptation of that term!*
--

name and likeness not vendible in gross, as it is not "property"). Hanna, however, has
been generally ignored. Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 I?. Supp. 1277,1282(D. Minn. 1970).
59. Prosser, supra note 1, at 389.
60. See note 17 supra.
61. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 21, at 200-01.
62. Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).

588

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[1977:

True, the right of publicity does not entail, in most cases, reproduction of "literary and artistic compositions," but it certainly
encompasses the other criteria set forth by Warren and Brandeis
as descriptive of a property interest. The right of publicity, where
recognized, is transferable. The common experience of celebrities
selling their endorsements to the highest bidder shows, aside from
transferability, that the right has a value. Publication, or controlled exposure by the celebrity, is how he makes a profit from
the right. Its value is certainly neither in the celebrity's "peace
of mind" nor in his ability to prevent any publication a t all about
himself. While the considerations involved in appropriation of a
truly "private" person's name or likeness may fall on the privacy
side of this analysis, Warren and Brandeis probably would not
include a celebrity's right of publicity under the right of privacy.
Continued use of the "privacy" label by courts dealing with the
right of publicity issue may be unfounded as well as unwise.
Some courts, noting the basic differences between the concepts of privacy and right of publicity, may be about to remove
the right of publicity from the general privacy rubrkfi3In
Uhlaender v. Henricksen," the plaintiff sued on behalf of all
major league baseball players to enjoin the use of their names in
the defendant's table baseball game. The defendant sought to
treat the matter as a privacy action, but the court quickly clarified what could have become muddy waters:
Although misappropriation of one's name, likeness or personality for commercial use has been considered as one species
of the general tort of invasion of privacy, many authorities suggest that misappropriation is a distinctly independent tort. The
reasoning behind this approach is that Prosser's first three categories involve the incidence of specific personal harm (i.e., injury to feelings), while the fourth [appropriation] is generally
considered to involve a pecuniary loss, an interference with
property .65

In a more recent federal case from the Southern District of
New York, the widows of Stan Laurel and Oliver Hardy brought
an action for appropriation of the right of publicity against the
63. Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481 (3d Cir. 1955);
Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953);Grant
v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Canessa v. J.I. Kislak, Inc., 97 N.J.
Super. 327, 235 A.2d 62 (1967); Hogan v. A.S. Barnes & Co., Inc., 114 U.S.P.Q. 314 (Pa.
C.P. 1957).
64. 316 F. Supp. 1277 (D. Minn. 1970).
65. Id. at 1279-80 (footnote omitted).
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holders of copyrights to certain of the comedians' films? The
court held for the plaintiffs and firmly distinguished the right of
publicity from the right of privacy:
While much confusion is generated by the notion that the
right of publicity emanates from the classic right of privacy, the
two rights are clearly separable. The protection from intrusion
upon an individual's privacy, on the one hand, and protection
from appropriation of some element of an individual's personality for commercial exploitation, on the other hand, are different
in theory and scope.67

The court extended the right of publicity to its logical end, holding that since it could be termed a property right, it survived the
death of the comedians and descended to their wives? A California court has reached a similar conclusion concerning Bella Lugosi's right of p u b l i ~ i t y . ~ ~

C. Privacy, Appropriation, and the First Amendment:
Confusing the Disparate Branches
While the right of publicity is clearly separable from the right
of privacy, most courts have refused to make a clean break with
the privacy rubric. The right of publicity, therefore, hovers somewhere as a subdivision of the appropriation privacy tort, which
in turn is a subdivision of general privacy theory. Aside from
semantic difficulties involved in classifying a celebrity's proprietary interest in his personality as a privacy interest, courts have
had some problems keeping the various branches of privacy
theory distinct from each other. A pronounced difficulty in this
area was encountered when courts began balancing the first
amendment against the diverse privacy torts.
As has been noted, Warren and Brandeis did not believe the
right of privacy protected matters of public interest.'O The Supreme Court, consistent with this reasoning, held that in false
light privacy cases matters of public interest are privileged unless
published with knowing falsity or reckless disregard for the
truth.71But the fact that the privilege attached to the "discrete
context"72of false light cases was often forgotten, and courts ap66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
Id. at 843 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 844.
Lugosi v. Universal Pictures Co., 172 U.S.P.Q. 541, 551 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1972).
Notes 36-38 and accompanying text supra.
Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387-88 (1967).
Id. at 390-91.
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plied the privilege to privacy cases generall~.'~
And courts, committed to "privacy-includes-appropriation" reasoning, have not
always resisted the temptation to transfer the first amendment
privilege for false light cases over to appropriation cases since,
after all, they both involve "privacy." Similar reasoning led the
Ohio Supreme Court into error when balancing first amendment
concerns against the right of publicity in Z~cchini.'~
The verbal thicket in this area of privacy law is dense, and
the confusion palpable. An examination, therefore, of one jurisdiction's confusion of the false light first amendment privilege
with the appropriation tort and the subsequent resolution of that
confusion will shed light on what happened in Zucchini. New
York has been chosen for this dubious honor, for no particular
reason other than that the evolution and ultimate resolution of
the confusion is clearly demonstrated by cases from that jurisdiction.
At this point it becomes necessary to consider the oft cited,
sometimes maligned75case of Time, Inc. u. Hill.76One of the
major Supreme Court pronouncements on privacy, the case
began in the New York courts as what Prosser would classify as
a "false light" tort. The Hill family had undergone the harrowing
experience of being held captive in the Hill home by escaped
convicts. The family's experience was dramatized in a book and
later produced as a Broadway play. Life magazine took actors
from the play to the home where the incident occurred to reenact
scenes from the play. These scenes were published as if depicting
the actual experiences of the family, while in reality there was
substantial fictionalization. The Hill family brought an action
under the New York statute for invasion of privacy. Recognizing
that the first amendment commanded some protection of the
speech involved, the New York Court of Appeals allowed the Hills
to recover only upon a showing of material and substantial falsification." The Supreme Court reversed, holding
that the constitutional protections for speech and press preclude
the application of the New York statute to redress false reports
of matters of public interest in the absence of proof that the
73. Notes 85-101 and accompanying text infra.
74. Notes 130-41 and accompanying text infra.
75. Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Times to Time: First Amendment Theory
L. REV.935 (1968).
Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Riuacy, 56 CALIF.
76. 385 U.S.374 (1967).
77. Id. at 386-87.
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defendant published the report with knowledge of its falsity or
in reckless disregard of the

The language, "knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of
the truth," was borrowed directly from the famous libel case of
New York Times Co. v. S ~ l l i v a n That
. ~ ~ case, involving the alleged libel of a public official, held that a state under the first and
fourteenth amendments could not award damages to a public
official for "defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct
unless he proves 'actual malice'-that the statement was made
with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard of whether
it was true or false."80The New York Times case was the beginning of a string of Supreme Court cases dealing with first amendment impact on defamationY The court in Hill expressly stated
that its use of the falsity standard from New York Times was not
but a studied one made after consideraa "blind applicati~n,"~~
tion of the factors arising in the particular context of privacy
actions: "Therefore, although the First Amendment principles
pronounced in New York Times guide our conclusion, we reach
that conclusion only by applying these principles in this discrete
context."" Thus, for false light privacy cases involving matters of
public interest, Hill commands substantial first amendment prot e c t i ~ n Application
.~~
of Hill to other cases has, however, some78. Id. a t 387-88.
79. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
80. Id. a t 254.
81. Some of the more prominent of these defamation cases, cited by the Supreme
Court in Zucchini, 97 S. Ct. a t 2856, include: Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S.
29 (1971) (New York Times actual malice test extended to matters of "public interest");
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) ("public interest" test for application of
the actual malice standard reviewed; defamed private individuals may recover on a lesser
showing than knowing or reckless falsity); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976)
(Gertz substantially reaffirmed).
82. 385 U.S. 374, 390 (1967).
83. Id. a t 390-91.
84. However, the present status of the Hill test even in false light privacy cases is
questionable due to the recent contraction in application of the New York Times actual
malice standard in defamation cases involving private individuals. See Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). The Court has questioned the broad applicability of the
standard in false light privacy cases involving private individuals. In Cantrell v. Forest
City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974), the Court reviewed a false light privacy case
involving a newspaper follow-up story on the family of a bridge collapse victim. Because
the jury had been adequately instructed on the Hill falsity standard, the Court wrote:
Consequently, this case presents no occasion to consider whether a State may
constitutionally apply a more relaxed standard of liability for a publisher or
broadcaster of false statements injurious to a private individual under a falselight theory of invasion of privacy, or whether the constitutional standard announced in Time, Inc. v. Hill applies to all false-light cases.
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times engendered confusion, because instead of applying Hill's
falsity test in the "discrete context" of false light privacy cases,
courts have often applied it much more broadly.
The New York Court of Appeals was struggling with another
privacy case contemporaneously with the Supreme Court's deliberation of Hill. Spahn v. Julian Messner, I ~ Cinvolved
. ~ ~ a rather
liberally fictionalized, unauthorized biography of the well-known
baseball star, Warren Spahn. He brought an action to enjoin
publication and recover damages under the New York privacy
statute. The New York court had two opportunities to set down
its opinion of this case, since after the first disposition the Supreme Court vacated the decision and remanded it for consideration in the light of Hill. There was in the two opinions some
mixing of appropriation and false light privacy theory.
In the first opinion the court outlined the reasons typically
cited for acknowledging a right of publicity:
The size of the audience attracted to each game, whether
in person or by transmission, is the profession's [baseball's]
bread and butter. The individual player's income will frequently
be a direct reflection of his popularity and abiltiy to attract an
audience. Professional privacy is thus the very antithesis of the
player $ need and goal .86

The court next summarized the purposes behind the New York
privacy statute and emphasized one of its important exceptions-that the law affords the public figure's privacy "little prot e c t i ~ n . "The
~ ~ court differentiated, however, the plaintiffs
privacy interest and his right to be paid for and control the use
of his personality:
But it is erroneous to confuse privacy with "personality" or
to assume that privacy, though lost for a certain time or in a
certain context, goes forever unprotected . . . . Thus it may be
Id. at 250-51. Subsequently, in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975), also
a privacy case, Justice Powell in his concumng opinion noted:
The Court's abandonment of the "matter of general or public interest" standard
as the determinative factor for deciding whether to apply the New York Times
malice standard to defamation litigation brought by private individuals, Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc. . . . calls into question the conceptual basis of Time, Inc.
v. Hill.
Id. at 498 n.2.
85. 18 N.Y.2d 324, 221 N.E.2d 543, 274 N.Y.S.2d 877 (1966), vacated, 387 U.S. 239,
on remand, 20 N.Y .2d 752,229 N.E.Fd 712,283 N.Y.S.2d 119, on reargument, 21 N.Y .2d
124, 233 N.E.2d 840, 286 N.Y.S.2d 832 (1967), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 1046 (1969).
86. Id. at 327, 221 N.E.2d at 544, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 878 (emphasis added).
87. Id. at 328, 221 N.E.2d at 545, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 879.
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appropriate to say that plaintiff here, Warren Spahn, is a public
personality and that, insofar as his professional career is involved, he is substantially without a right to privacy. That is not
to say, however, that his "personality" may be fictionalized and
that, as fictionalized, it may be exploited for the defendants'
commercial benefit through the medium of an unauthorized bi~graphy.~~

Holding that a "substantially fictitious" biography would not run
afoul of first amendment requirement^,^^ the court allowed recovery by the plaintiff. Arguably, then, the New York court was
vindicating an interest similar to the right of publicity. Fatefully,
however, the court mentioned that it did not believe the New
York Times test had any application to the case.90
The Supreme Court vacated the decision and ordered reargument of the caseg1in light of Hill.On remand, Spahn, which up
to this point may well have been a right of publicity case, was
treated as a false light privacy case, ignoring the previous right
of publicity discussion.
The court wrote:
We hold . . . that, before recovery by a public figure may be had
for an unauthorized presentation of his life, it must be shown
. that the presentation is infected with material and substantial falsification and that the work was published with
knowledge of such falsification or with a reckless disregard for
the

The court held the evidence supported a finding of requisite falsity, and again awarded relief to the plaintiff.93
The boundaries between the false light privacy tort and the
right of publicity tort in cases such as Spahn are admittedly
tricky. Is a fictionalized biography an appropriation of Spahn's
interest in his name and personality (right of publicity), or is
relief granted for the untruthful manner in which his life story is
presented to the public (false light)? Resolution of this quandry
is beyond the scope of this Comment, but acknowledgment of the
difficulty avoids untempered criticism of the seeming confusion
of the court in Spahn. Whatever the difficulties in the factual
context of Spahn, however, New York courts floundered in cases
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id.
Id. at 329, 221 N.E.2d at 545, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 880.
Id.
387 U.S. 329 (1967).
21 N.Y.2d at 127, 233 N.E.2d at 842, 286 N.Y .S.2d at 834.
Id. at 129, 233 N.E.2d at 843, 286 N.Y.S.2d at 836.
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where distinctions between false light privacy and appropriation
were not nearly so fine.
In Paulsen v. Personality Posters, Inc. ,94comedian Pat Paulsen sought an injunction under the New York privacy statute
against the defendant's distribution of a campaign poster during
Paulsen's mock candidacy in the 1968 presidential race. The case
was most definitely not a false light case. The defendant allegedly
had appropriated a photograph of Paulsen and reproduced it with
the words "For President" beneath it. The court wrote that the
privacy statute was to protect a "person's right to be let alone,"
and was not enacted to afford relief for "various . . . species of
property rights."95Since the plaintiff was not seeking redress for
"privacy," the privacy statute could not help him. Moreover, the
court observed that even were the privacy statute applicable, the
appropriation in the case would be privileged by the first amendment:
[Wlhether the poster involved be considered as a significant
satirical commentary upon the current presidential contest, or
merely as a humorous presentation of a well-known entertainer's
publicity gambit, or in any other light, be it social criticism or
pure entertainment, it is sufficiently relevant to a matter of
public interest to be a form of expression which is constitutionally protected and "deserving of substantial freedom?"'

The reasoning of the court is inexorable. Because of first
amendment principles, the right of privacy cannot redress publication of matters of public interest. If the appropriation here is
styled as an invasion of privacy, it is therefore privileged by the
first amendment. Thankfully, at least for credulity's sake, the
court spared the discussion of possible results were the poster
published with knowing "falsity" or reckless disregard of whether
it was "true."
Two years after Paulsen, a federal court in New York was
confronted with another appropriation suit under the New York
privacy statute. The plaintiff in Man v. Warner Brothers, Inc. 97
sought damages for the defendant's unauthorized use of his 45second performance of "Mess Call" on the flugelhorn during the
renowned Woodstock rock festival. The segment, filmed by the
defendants during the festival, had been inserted into the com94. 59 Misc. 2d 444,299 N.Y.S.2d 501 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
95. Id. at 450,299 N.Y.S.2d at 608.
96. Id.

97. 317 F. Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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pany's commercial film of the event. It would appear that a
clearer case of commercial appropriation would indeed be difficult to find. Yet the court denied relief.
The court explained that the New York privacy statute was
designed to protect persons from the unauthorized use of their
pictures for purposes of trade! The court noted, however, that
subsequent cases had engrafted exceptions onto the rule to avoid
abridgment of the constitutional right of free speech:
These cases establish that in light of the constitutional guarantee of free speech, Section 51 may not be applied to afford relief
either to a public figure or in a matter of public interest in the
absence of proof that the defendant published false material
with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of the truth.
Time, Inc. v. Hill . . . .99

The plaintiff, unless he could show that the defendants knowingly
appropriated a "false" performance, or used one in reckless disregard of its "truthfulness," was precluded from relief.
In 1968, one noted scholar writing on the impact of the first
amendment in the privacy area, noted that the appropriation
branch of privacy would probably not raise any first amendment
problems.loOThe rationale was that "[tlhis right, sometimes
called the right of publicity, involves the commercial appropriation of values which, whether or not labeled as 'property,' may
not be freely plundered under the banner of the first amendment."lol But, nevertheless, the plunderers had waved the banner-and had won.
New York appellate courts were to redraw the line between
first amendment privileges and appropriation three years later.
In Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Urban Systems, Inc. ,Io2 a corporation formed by Howard Hughes to exploit his name and personality sued the defendants for their use of Hughes' name and biographical data in its "The Howard Hughes Game." The defendants, predictably, placed heavy reliance on Paulsen. The
Rosemont court dismissed this argument, stating that the
"Paulsen case is unique to its facts and must be so considered."lo3
98. Id. at 51.
99. Id. at 51-52.
100. Nimmer, supra note 75, at 957-58.
101. Id. (footnotes omitted).
102. 72 Misc. 2d 788, 340 N.Y.S.2d 144 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd as modified, 42 App. Div.
2d 544, 345 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1973) (injunction limited to state of New York).
103. Id. at 790, 340 N.Y .S.2d at 146.
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In contrast to the Paulsen court, the Rosernont court had little
difficultyin extending protection of the New York privacy statute
to appropriation of a celebrity's personality.lo4
Then, after concluding that a celebrity's right of publicity
was worthy of protection, the court asked the question in this area
that, because left unasked, had caused confusion and absurd results: "The question apparently is where does one draw the line
between the right of the public to 'know' and an act of
appropriation."lo5The court, however, declined to draw any definite line, preferring to leave the question to resolution by the
courts on an ad hoc basis:
As the Paulsen case, supra, would indicate this area of the law
is plastic. Each case must be decided by weighing conflicting
policies; the public interest in free dissemination of information,
against the interest in the preservation of inviolate personality
and property rights. Among the relevant factors in such decisions are the media used, the nature of the subject matter, and
the extent of the actual invasion of privacy . . . .106

The ad hoc balance in the present case favored the plaintiff, the
court held, as the defendants were really not disseminating news,
but rather a game of chance.lo7
New York, it appears, had finally battled its way through the
sematic jungle of the privacy-appropriation-publicity cases to
where the actual interests at stake in such cases could be identified and, importantly, balanced against possibly competing first
amendment interests. There had been a few casualties along the
way,lo8but even though the line between first amendment interests and the right of publicity was not crystal clear, the general
highway was safely marked out.
The Supreme Court in Zacchini saved Ohio, and other
states, similar difficulties.
104. Id. :
The instant action is quite clearly premised upon an appropriation for for commercial exploitation of plaintiffs property rights in his name and career rather
than upon an injury to feelings. There is no question but that a celebrity has a
legitimate proprietary interest in his public personality. He must be considered
as having invested years of practice and competition in a public personality
which eventually may reach marketable status. That identity is a fruit of his
labors and a type of property
105. Id. (emphasis added).
106. Id. a t 790, 340 N.Y .S.2d at 147.
107. Id.
108. See, e.g., Man v. Warner Bros. Inc., 317 F. Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Gautier
v. Pro-Football, Inc., 304 N.Y. 354, 107 N.E.2d 485 (1952).

....

5791

RIGHT OF PRIVACY

597

111. Zacchini IN STATECOURT:
PRIVACY'S
BRAMBLE
BUSH

After summary judgment for defendant in the trial court,
Zacchini took his cause to the Ohio Eighth District Court of Appeals. That court held for him.loB
The court's opinion began with Prosser's division of privacy
into four branches, and noted that while the plaintiff claimed an
invasion of his privacy, "we think none of Professor Prosser's
categories provide a logically adequate embrace for the wrong the
plaintiff claims has been done."l1° The court, noting that there
was no privacy statute in Ohio, stated that common law privacy
theory would not affect the case as Zacchini's claim "does not
involve his privacy in any usual sense of the word."lll The court
evidently had recognized the inherent differences between
privacy and right of publicity:
The performance which constitutes an "act" is the product
of the actor's talent and is his property. And, if his act is appropriately considered a dramatic or creative production, it involves a property right entitled to the same protection under the
common law as any other property right . . . .112

The court wrote that while critical reviews or announcements of
an act were to be distinguished, appropriation of an entire act on
videotape was a consequence of "appalling perspective."l13 Then,
the court groped for pigeonholes in which to categorize the tort.
Stretching the concepts to the breaking point, it chose conversion114and common law copyright.l15
The court noted that in "ancient history" only tangibles
could be converted,l16but stated that the concept had been expanded to cover such symbols as promissory notes, checks, and
stock certificates and that cases like Zacchini demanded a further
extension. As for common law copyright, the court noted that this
principle gives the creator of "intellectual productions" an inter109. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., No. 33,713, slip op. (Ohio Ct.
App. July 10, 1975).
110. Id. at A30.
111. Id. at A32.
112. Id. at A33.
113. Id.
114. Id. at A34.
115. Id. at A35. The Supreme Court, in the course of its opinion in Zacchini, analogized the right of publicity to patent and copyright laws. 97 S. Ct. at 2856-57. The state
appellate court, however, went further than analogy-it claimed that common law copyright law was directly applicable to the conflict before it.
116. Zacchini v. Scripps-HowardBroadcasting Co., No. 33,713, slip op. at A34 (Ohio
Ct. App. July 10, 1975).
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est in his works until lost by general publication.l17 The court
wrote that dramatic productions have been protected as literary
property, and by "clear analogy the performance with which this
case is concerned falls within the category of dramatic production."l18 As for the defendant's contention that public performance a t the fair constituted publication eliminating protection of
common law copyright, the court wrote that such an issue "is one
which must be resolved a t further proceedings in the trial
court ."llB
In response to the defendant's first amendment contentions,
the court succinctly stated "the First Amendment provides no
defense to the taking of private property against the owner's explicit denial of permission."120The court explained further that
the first amendment was "not properly an issue here:"121
There is no suggestion of a limitation on the defendant's right
to comment. This case is not controlled by the reasons for reversing the plaintiffs verdict in Time, Inc. v. Hill . . . . For
that case involved a right to privacy to "redress false reports of
matters of public interest" under the New York statute . . . .
. . . The constitutional protection for free dissemination of
ideas is neither threatened nor diminished by protecting the
owner of property from its seizure under the guise of free expression.lZ2

A concurring opinion by Judge Manos added that the proper
basis for recovery in the case was violation of the plaintiff's common law right of pub1i~ity.l~~
The state supreme court disagreed with the intermediate
court on the issues of conversion and common law copyright.lu
The state high court noted that since the "distinguishing characteristic of conversion is the forced judicial sale of the chattel or
right"125wrongfully taken, extending conversion to the facts of the
instant case where only "~ludicialingenuity" could find a res
to be sold would be "confusing, unnecessary, and improper."126As
117. Id. at A35.
118. Id. a t A37.
119. Id.
120. Id. at A40.
121. Id. at A39.
122. Id. at A39-A40.
123. Id. a t A41 (Manos, J., concurring).
124. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 47 Ohio St. 2d 224, 226, 351
N.E.2d 454, 456 (1976).
125. Id. at 227, 351 N.E.2d at 457.
126. Id.
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for common law copyright, the state high court held the concept
inapplicable to plaintiffs act as it was "not a literary or artistic
expression, nor [was] it a dramatic composition, nor [was] it
original."12' Logic that public performances would not constitute
a publication terminating the right was dubbed "doubtful,"128as
such logic would grant a perpetual right against copying. The
court concluded with its opinion "that plaintiffs claim is one for
invasion of the right of privacy by appropriation, and should be
considered as such."129Unfortunately, the state supreme court,
critical of the appellate court's handling of the conversion and
copyright concepts, did not explore the substance of the lower
court's reasoning-especially on the first amendment issue. The
state appellate court perhaps botched the labels it applied to the
substance of its holding; the state supreme court, however,
botched the substance it placed behind its labels.
The state supreme court, having resolved that it was adjudicating a privacy case, proceeded to delineate the elements of the
appropriation branch of privacy. The court noted that jurisdictions with a privacy statute, such as New York, commonly require
the appropriation to be for commercial uses, while common law
jurisdictions probably do not require that the appropriation be
used for purposes of trade:130 "The interest which the law protects
is that of each individual to the exclusive use of his own identity,
and that interest is entitled to protection from misuse whether
the misuse is for commercial purposes or otherwise."131 The court
then noted the distinction that had led the lower court to digress
into conversion and common law copyright-what the plaintiff
was seeking to protect was not his right to be "let alone," but his
right to be paid for his performances:
It is this right, a right of exclusive control over the publicity
given to his performances, which the plaintiff seeks to protect.
For a performer, this right is a valuable part of the benefit which
may be attained by his talents and efforts, and we think that
this right is entitled to legal protection, contrary to the holding
of some earlier cases.132

Thus, the court expressly adopted a common law right of publicity. It had, in effect, reached the same conclusion as had the lower
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 228, 351 N.E.2d at 457.
at 226, 351 N.E.2d at 456.
at 229, 351 N.E.2d at 458.
at 232, 351 N.E.2d at 460.
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court-the plaintiff had a valuable proprietary interest protected
by law. But where the lower state court ascribed this right to
conversion or copyright theory, the state supreme court adopted
a new slot, the right of publicity. And somewhere above this slot
was still hanging the label "privacy." While the lower court had
avoided the confusion caused by the privacy-first amendment
interface, the state supreme court was about to fall prey to some
attractive, but shallow, reasoning.
After establishing the right of publicity, the court next asked
whether invasion of that right by the defendant was privileged by
the first amendment.133 The court answered affirmatively. The
court began with the premise that the right of publicity fell under
the right of privacy. Hill, according to the court, established a
privilege "to report matters of legitimate public interest even
though such reports might intrude on matters otherwise pri~ a t e . " lIt~ was
~ "clear" to the court that a "public performance
in a county fair is a matter of legitimate public interest?" Therefore, the defendant's use of the 15-second film clip of the plaintiff
exploding from his cannon was privileged by the first amendment. The court stated:
No fixed standard which would bar the press from reporting or
depicting either an entire occurrence or an entire discrete part
of a public performance can be formulated which would not
unduly restrict the "breathing room" in reporting which freedom of the press requires. The proper standard must necessarily
be whether the matters reported were of public interest . . . .136

But what of Hill's restriction on its first amendment privilege
that a publication cannot be made with knowing falsity or reckless disregard for truth or falsity? To its credit, the Ohio court did
not write into its opinion a limitation that broadcasters cannot
show "knowingly false" videotapes of human cannonballs.
Rather, the court stated that the broadcast privilege would be lost
"only if its actual intent was not to report the performance, but,
rather, to appropriate the performance for some other private use,
or if the actual intent was to injure the performer."137
Justice Celebrezze filed a dissenting opinion questioning the
validity of the court's reliance on Hill in view of both the exten133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at 233, 351 N.E.2d at 460.
Id. at 234, 351 N.E.2d at 461.
Id. at 235, 351 N.E.2d at 461.
Id.
Id.
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sive alterations of the Supreme Court's views on defamation since
New York Times and the questionable present stand of the court
on the issue presented in Hill.138
The lockstep reasoning of the Ohio Supreme Court has not
been without supporters. A student comment on the court's decision concluded that the proper result was reached.13gBut the
Supreme Court in Time, Inc. u. Firestone,140another defamation
case, warned against the hasty use of labels to reach legal results.
The right of publicity may fit under the general broad heading
of privacy, but that does not mean that the supposed first amendment privilege attached to false light privacy cases necessarily
attaches to the right of publicity. "Whatever their general validity, use of such [generalized] subject matter classifications to
determine the extent of constitutional protection afforded . . .
may too often result in an improper balance between the competing interest . . . ."141

IV. THESUPREME
COURT'S
APPROACH:
BALANCING
THE INTERESTS
A. Settling the Confusion
Zucchini gave the Court the opportunity to establish that
Ohio's balance between free speech and proprietary interests in
right of publicity cases is not mandated by the constitution. Following its own caveat from Firestone, the Court carefully examined the interests involved in the right of publicity before balancing that right against the first amendment.
First, the Court noted that the interests involved in the false
light and right of publicity torts are different. The interest protected in false light cases is "clearly that of reputation, with the
same overtones of mental distress as in defamation. By contrast,
the State's interest in permitting a 'right of publicity' is in protecting the proprietary interest of the individual in his act in part
138. Id: at 236-40, 351 N.E.2d at 462-65 (Celebrezze, J., dissenting); see also note 84
supra.
139. Comment, Tort Law: Appropriation of a Performer's Act By the News Media-Is
L.J. 786 (1977). The Comment concludes:
It Privileged?, 16 WASHBURN
By articulating the "right of publicity" under which a public figure may control
the commercial use of his name and likeness, the Ohio court lends new impetus
to the growing body of legal writers who have acknowledged this branch of the
"right of privacy." The court's recognition of the limitations placed on the rights
of privacy and publicity by the factual reporting of matters of legitimate public
interest adheres to an accepted principle of American law.
Id. at 791 (footnotes omitted).
140. 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
141. Id. at 456.
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to encourage such entertainment? The Court likened this latter goal to those of patent and copyright laws that assure the
individual the fruits of his labors and have "little to do with
protecting feelings or reputation."ld3Additionally, the two torts
differ in the "degree to which they intrude on dissemination of
information to the public."ld4 In false light cases, a plaintiff is
eager to minimize publication. In right of publicity cases, however, instead of arguing for limiting publication the plaintiff is
merely litigating the question of "who gets to do the publishing."ld5The Court, therefore, held that Hill was inapplicable.ld6
Other defamation cases with arguable impact on the case were
also summarily dismissed:
These cases, like New York Times, emphasize the protection
extended to the press by the First Amendment in defamation
cases, particularly when suit is brought by a public official or a
public figure. None of them involve an alleged appropriation by
the press of a right of publicity existing under state law.147

The Court, of course, did not discuss the propriety or necessity
of establishing a common law right of publicity, but did give its
answer to the question posed by the New York court in Rosernont:
"[Wlhere does one draw the line between the right of the public
to know and an act of a p p r ~ p r i a t i o n ? " ~ ~ ~
Wherever the line in particular situations is to be drawn between media reports that are protected and those that are not,
we are quite sure that the First and Fourteenth Amendments do
not immunize the media when they broadcast a performer's
entire act without his ~ 0 n s e n t . l ~ ~

On remand, Ohio may privilege the press in the circumstances of
Zacchini, but the "First and Fourteenth Amendments do not
require it to do so."150
Justice Powell, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall,
142. 97 S . Ct. at 2856 (quoting Prosser, supra note 1, at 400) (footnote omitted).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 2855-56.
147. Id. at 2856 (emphasis added). The cases cited by the Court were Time, Inc. v.
Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); and
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
148. Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Urban Syss., Inc., 72 Misc. 2d 788, 790, 340
N.Y.S.2d 144, 146 (Sup. Ct. 1973); see notes 105-07 and accompanying text supra.
149. 97 S. Ct. at 2856-57 (emphasis added).
150. Id. at 2858.
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dissented. He argued that first amendment privileges should not
be based upon appropriation of an "entire act," but on the use a
television station makes of the act: "I would hold that the First
Amendment protects the station from a 'right of publicity' or
'appropriation' suit, absent a strong showing by the plaintiff that
the news broadcast was a subterfuge or cover for private or commercial exploitation."151 Justice Stevens also dissented, arguing
that Ohio's grounds for decision were so unclear as to warrant
remand for clarification rather than for the Court to assume that
the decision was based on first amendment and not independent
state grounds.152

B. Validity of the Court's Result
With a relatively brief opinion,ls3the Supreme Court managed in Zucchini to untangle several major confusions in privacy
law. The performer's interest in his act or personality protected
under the heading of the right of publicity was clearly analogized
to copyright and patent law.15*So classified, the right runs little
risk of being "waived" when a celebrity loses his "privacy" or of
encountering the other difficulties outlined earlier in this Comment.l" Most importantly, the right of publicity branch of privacy law was firmly distinguished from a false light privacy tort
and its concomitant first amendment privilege. While the Court
left the right of publicity under the general privacy rubric,lS6possibility of confusion between false light and appropriation torts
in the future should be remote-a false light case involves "an
entirely different tort than the 'right of publicity' . . . .v 157
The balance struck by the Court between first amendment
concerns and the right of publicity was the result of careful weighing of competing proprietary and free speech interests. Inasmuch
as the Court analogized the interests involved to patent and copyright laws,158an analysis of competing copyright and first amend151. Id. at 2860 (Powell, J., dissenting).
152. Id. at 2860-61 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
153. The opinion, as printed in the Supreme Court Reporter, is only 12 pages long.
Id. at 2849 (1977).
154. Id. at 2856-57.
155. See notes 47-55 and accompanying text supra.
156. 97 S. Ct. at 2855.
157. Id. Completely severing the right of publicity from the privacy rubric would
substantially alleviate any remaining confusion in this area. As the right of publicity does
not involve the right to be "let alone," it unnecessarily complicates privacy law by its
inclusion. See notes 59-69 and accompanying text supra.
158. Id. at 2856-57.
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ment interests will be useful in evaluating the balance struck by
the Court between the right of publicity and free speech in
Zacchini.
Free speech interests in the copyright area are perhaps most
succintly summarized in the copyright clause of the Constitution:
"To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
These interests,
to their respective Writings and Disco~eries."~~~
as has been noted by Professor Nimmer,lWmay clash with the
interests protected by the first amendment. Some of these possibly conflicting first amendment interests were summarized by
Justice Brandeis in his classic concurrence in Whitney v.
California.161According to Brandeis, free speech is: first, a necessary component of a self-governing or democratic societydemocracy cannot long survive without informed electors;
second, an end in itself-man realizes self-fulfillment only if free
to express himself; and finally, a safety valve-it is hazardous to
discourage thought as men are less prone to violence if they can
express themselves nonvi01ently.l~~
The balance struck in the copyright area between these competing interests is that copyright
laws protect expression, while the first amendment privileges
ideasY3 Thus, according to Professor Nimmer, both copyright
and free speech interests are optimally served.164
Unshackling the
use of ideas does not hurt creators, as it is often necessary for
them to borrow liberally from each other anyway. Protecting expression-i. e., the form in which, for example, a book is set down
by an author-protects the author's proprietary interest in his
labor, but does not prohibit free discussion of the ideas contained
in the b00k.l~~
Moreover, Brandeis' three free speech interests are
vindicated. As ideas are not protected by copyright law, they can
be freely disseminated among a well-informed electorate. Selfexpression, the second Brandeis category, is not harmed as it
159. U.S. CONST.
art. I, 4 8, c1. 8.
160. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free
Speech and Press?, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1180, 1181 (1970).
161. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
162. Id. at 372-80 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
163. Cf. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546,571 (1973) (record piracy statute valid
as it does not restrict use of ideas); Robert Stigwood Group, Ltd. v. OYReilly,346 F. Supp.
376 (D. Conn. 1972) (unauthorized use of substantially the entire rock opera "Jesus Christ
Superstar" not privileged by first amendment); Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 345 F.
Supp. 108 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (unauthorized use of Disney cartoon characters not privileged
by first amendment).
164. Nimmer, supra note 160, at 1202.
165. Id.
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would not be served by allowing wholesale plagiarismplagiarism cannot be said to be "self-expression" in the first
place. Finally, men will not be prone to riot because they cannot
copy and claim as their own the work of another.lB6
The Supreme Court in Zacchini struck a similar balance
between the first amendment and the right of publicity when it
declared that appropriation of an "entire act" was not constitutionally privileged. Thus, while the "idea" of a human cannonball's act is not protected, Zacchini's actual performance is. Anyone with the requisite daring (or foolhardiness) can learn the
skills of a human cannonball, and Zacchini could not complain.lB7
The television station could express the "idea" that a human
cannonball was performing at the fair, and again Zacchini would
have no complaint. As the Court wrote, "It is evident, and there
is no claim to the contrary, that petitioner's state-law right of
publicity would not serve to prevent respondent from reporting
the newsworthy facts about petitioner's act."lB8Filming and televising Zacchini's stunt, however, was more than appropriation of
a mere "idea;" it was, to adapt language from Professor Nimmer,
appropriating "the particular selection and arrangement of ideas,
as well as . . . specificity in the form of their expression which
warrants protection under the [right of publicity]."16Q
The balance struck by the court between free speech and
right of publicity interests appears to be valid and reasonable.
Democratic dialogue will not appreciably suffer because viewers
of the late evening news will be limited to a photograph and
verbal description of the human cannonball's thrilling act instead
of a videotape of the entire event. The essential free speech content of the event will have been broadcast, and Mr. Zacchini's
proprietary interest in his act will have been protected. (How
many of the viewers would bother to travel to the fair and perhaps
pay an admission fee to see something they had observed on color
television the night before?) A television station seeking selffulfillment perhaps would prefer to broadcast its station manager
being shot out of a cannon rather than Zacchini, and it is doubtful
that being told about rather than seeing a human cannonball will
166. Id. at 1191-93.
167. The Court stated in a footnote, "Of course this case does not involve a claim
that respondents would be prevented by petitioner's 'right of publicity' from staging or
filming its own 'human cannonball' act." 97 S. Ct. at 2858 n.13.
168. Id. at 2856.
169. Nimmer, supra note 160, at 1190.
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provoke many television viewers to vi01ence.l~~
And besides protecting Zacchini's interest in his act, prohibiting a broadcast of
the event could have long-term benefits for the public-"the protection provides an economic incentive for him to make the investment required to produce a performance of interest to the
public. "171
Obviously, the "entire act" test is uniquely adapted to the
context of television news reports of performers' acts. The test
does not translate easily into other right of publicity cases involving differing factual settings-such as appropriation of a celebrity's picture as in Paulsen or appropriation of a celebrity's interest in his life story as in Rosemont. But, nevertheless, the holding
in Zacchini will be a significant roadmark in these cases as well.
Zacchini firmly establishes that the right of publicity protects
rights analogous to copyright and patent interests. Just as the
Supreme Court examined those interests in the specific context
of the Zacchini facts, other courts faced with factually dissimilar
right of publicity cases can look to the general area of copyright
and first amendment law for guidance. For example, the doctrine
of "fair use" in the copyright area, especially as outlined in the
new federal copyright statute,lT2should provide a touchstone for
resolution of cases similar to Rosemont and Paulsen.
170. Indeed, it is questionable whether viewing the human cannonball act would have
any impact on the television audience. The mere spectacle of a man being blown from a
cannon is probably pale when compared to the videoaction crammed into one hour of the
life of, for example, a television supercop.
171. 97 S. Ct. a t 2857.
172. Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (to be codified a t 17
U.S.C.). The new copyright statute, effective Jan. 1, 1978, explicitly outlines the criteria
to be used in determining whether use of copyright material is privileged as a "fair use:"
[Tlhe fair use of copyrighted work . . . for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use),
scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining
whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors
to be considered shall include(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation
to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market nor or value of
the copyrighted work.
Id. 5 107.
It is possible that the Supreme Court reached its decision in Zucchini after weighing
the factors involved in the case in a manner similar to that outlined in the above statute.
While the use was for news or arguably "educational" purposes, substantially all of the
human cannonball's act was appropriated; the Court expressed concern over the possible
ill effects this appropriation could have on the future value of the act. 97 S. Ct. a t 2857.
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C. Media Impact, Damages, and Consent
The balance struck by the Court between first amendment
and right of publicity interests in the area of media news reports
is certain to be unpopular in some quarters. Broadcasters, for
example, would almost assuredly prefer the approach taken by
the dissent, which would have privileged all uses of film footage
on news programs absent a showing of use for commercial exploitation.lT3But the effect of Zucchini on television news will probably not be great in any event. There are few "entire acts" short
enough to be broadcast in news programs; most such programs
use short film clips or videotape cuts lasting less than a few minutes. Thus, the "chilling" effect on the media decried by the
dissentlT4will probably be minimal. The Court in Zucchini employed what scholars have termed "definitional balancing"lT5in
announcing its result. Instead of leaving to trial courts the duty
to ascertain and balance on an ad hoc level the competing free
speech and proprietary interests in each right of publicity case
involving appropriation of an act (as, for example, the New York
court in Rosemont did), the courts and the media have been left
a rule-appropriation of "entire acts" is not privileged by the first
amendment. Although the "entire act" test may not be the
Court's final word on the subjectlT6and the term is burdened with
the usual semantic uncertainties of all new legal tests, it will be
rare that a television news editor will not be able to resolve most
doubts about liability by editing the clip so as to emphasize the
173. Id. a t 2860 (Powell, J., dissenting).
174. Id. a t 2859-60.
175. Nimmer, supra note 75, a t 942. The term "definitional balancing" was coined
to differentiate this practice from "ad hoc balancing." With ad hoc balancing, the trial
court discerns the conflicting free speech and proprietary interests a t stake in each case
and makes a judgment as to which, in the discrete context of the case, is weightier and
deserves to prevail. While ad hoc balancing appears to present the opportunity for perhaps
a more just resolution of a given case, it has one major drawback-the process leaves no
rule for the public and the courts to rely on. And often, absence of a rule tends to "chill"
exercise of first amendment rights. Not knowing what speech is protected, only the courageous speak. Id. a t 939-42. The definitional approach has the major advantage of leaving
a rule behind which can guide the outcome of future cases. "[Tlhe court employs balancing not for the purpose of determining which litigant deserves to prevail in the particular
case, but only for the purpose of defining which forms of speech are to be regarded as
'speech' within the meaning of the first amendment." Id. a t 942.
176. The Court wrote, "Wherever the line in particular situations is to be drawn
between media reports that are protected and those that are not, we are quite sure that
the First and Fourteenth Amendments do not immunize the media when they broadcast
a performer's entire act without his consent." 97 S. Ct. a t 2856-57 (emphasis added). This
holding, obviously, leaves open the possibility that something less than an "entire act"
may be protected by the right of publicity without any first amendment difficulty.
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"newsworthy facts" of an act rather than show it in its entirety.17'
Moreover, in states such as New York with a privacy statute,
the impact of Zacchini upon the media may well be nil. Ohio, a
common law privacy jurisdiction, does not require that the appropriation be for advertising purposes or for uses of trade. Privacy
statutes uniformly require such a use.178Prosser's text on torts,
cited by the Supreme Court,17' states that while newspapers are
published for a profit, not everything printed in the newspaper
meets the statutory definition of "for trade purposes."180Therefore, in statutory privacy jurisdictions, a television news program
using film clips even of "entire acts" may escape liability if such
use is not "for trade purposes."
If found liable, the media will obviously be concerned about
possible damage awards in right of publicity suits. The majority
opinion in Zacchini states that one of the major rationales for the
right of publicity is to prevent unjust enrichment: "No social
purpose is served by having the defendant get for free some aspect
of the plaintiff that would have market value and for which he
would normally pay."lgl Thus, it appears that the measure of
damages in these appropriation cases could be the profit the defendant realizes by his wrongful appropriation. In a footnote,
however, the Court talks as though the measure of damages
would be the injury to the plaintiffs income caused by decreased
public interest in seeing the act live after viewing it on televi~ i 0 n . Inasmuch
l~~
as the Court analogized the right of publicity
to copyright law, presumably recovery of damages would be similar to recovery of damages under copyright law. Under common
law copyright damages rules, a plaintiff may recover the change
in market value of his proprietary interest or, alternatively, the
profits derived by the defendant from the infringement.'" Since
the common law allows both measures of recovery, ambivalence
177. Id9
178. Typical is the New York statute, which requires that the use be for "the purpose
LAW $6 50-51 (McKinney 1976).
of advertising" or "for trade purposes." N.Y. Cw. RGHTS
See note 30 and accompanying text supra.
179. 97 S. Ct. a t 2856-57 n.11.
180. W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK
OF THE LAWOF TORTS
806-07 (4th ed. 1971).
181. 97 S. Ct. a t 2857 (citing Kalven, supra note 27, a t 331).
182. Id. n.12: "It is possible, of course, that respondent's news broadcast increased
the value of petitioner's performance by stimulating the public's interest in seeing the act
live. In these circumstances, petitioner would not be able to prove damages and thus
would not recover."
The dissent, with some disapproval, noted this seeming ambivalence on damages. Id.
a t 2859 n .2 (Powell, J., dissenting).
NIMMER
ON COPYRIGHT
$ 150 (1963).
183. M. NIMMER,
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on the damage question in the majority's opinion is likely not a
product of court oversight.
Damages, it should be further noted, will be a difficult part
of the plaintiffs case. Proving decreased income as a direct result
of a television broadcast-or unjust enrichment of the broadcaster-may be impossible in some cases. Thus, the damage element of right of publicity cases alone may be sufficient to shield
the media from any barrage of unfounded Zucchini-type lawsuits.
Another possible escape for the media lies in the consent
requirement of the Zacchini holding. If use of the "entire act" is
with the performer's consent, no liability arises.lg4The factual
circumstances of Zacchini were rather unusual, in that plaintiff
expressly objected to the filming and broadcasting, yet that
objection was disregarded.ls5Most performers will be aware of the
presence of news cameras during their acts because of the necessary lights and often bulky equipment. There are several old cases
holding that consent, if not express, will at least be implied from
long acquiescence with knowledge of infringement.18' Presence of
a television news camera a t his act should certainly inform a
performer that his interest in his act is about to be "infringed."
He must also realize that in these days of electronic journalism
he cannot "acquiesce" for longer than a few hours or any film of
his act will have been broadcast. Thus, it may be reasonable to
argue that the performer impliedly consents if he allows the filming and does not object before broadcasting.18' This implication,
however, places a heavy burden on the performer and is a rather
extreme extension of the older consent cases-in those instances
plaintiffs had been aware of the infringing use for a period of some
years.

The right of privacy, envisioned by Warren and Brandeis as
-

184. 97 S. Ct. a t 2856-57.
185. Id. a t 2851.
186. Edwin L. Wiegand Co. v. Harold E. Trent Co., 122 F.2d 920 (3d Cir.),' cert.
denied, 316 U.S. 667 (1941); H.M. Chandler Co. v. Penn Paper Prods., 88 F. Supp. 753
(S.D.N.Y. 1950).
187. This implication, of course, could not be made where live cameras were used to
broadcast the act simulaneously with its performance and the performer had no form of
advance warning.
188. For example, the plaintiff in Edwin L. Wiegand Co. v. Harold E. Trent Co., 122
F.2d 920 (3d Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 667 (1942), waited over three years to bring
suit after he first knew of the defendant's infringement.
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the right to be "let alone,"18Bhas grown to encompass various
interests-often having little in common. Recently, courts have
recognized that the proprietary interests protected by the right of
publicity are separate and distinct from those of other privacy
torts-specifically invasions of privacy through placing a person
in a false light. But in spite of these basic differences, constitutional free speech provisions applicable to false light cases have
sometimes been applied across the board to all privacy cases,
including appropriation and right of publicity cases, with little
thought as to the underlying issues involved.
The Supreme Court in Zacchini was faced with an instance
of just such reasoning. The Ohio Supreme Court had reasoned
that the right of publicity is a branch of privacy theory, that
matters otherwise protected by privacy theory are privileged by
the first amendment if they are of public interest, and that therefore an appropriation is privileged if the matter appropriated is
of public interest. Though states may reach such a result on the
basis of state law, the Supreme Court held that the first amendment does not mandate such a result. The underlying interests
protected by the false light privacy tort and the right of publicity
tort are diverse and demand different first amendment analyses.
While the false light tort is concerned with reputation, the publicity tort protects a person's valuable interest in his name and
personality. Tension between the first amendment and the publicity tort resembles that between the first amendment and the
copyright laws. Just as copyright laws protect the discrete expression of literary property while the first amendment defends the
free exchange of ideas, so the right of publicity protects the expression of a performer's act while the first amendment privileges
the "idea" of the act. It is now settled that the first amendment
does not protect appropriation of a performer's entire act. Further
analogies from copyright and first amendment law will be useful
in other factual settings involving the right of publicity.
While the resolution of the competing interests in Zacchini
is not expected to be popular with the media, it appears to provide a proper balance of the rights involved. Though the public
should be informed of the performance of a human cannonball at
the fair if a television station elects to broadcast such information, the television station has no right to obtain and exploit an
interest in the performance for which others would normally have
to pay. This assures the performer the fruits of his labor and may
189. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 21, at 195.
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in the end benefit the public, as the performer will have the
incentive to continually produce an act interesting to the public.
When Hugo Zacchini was fired from his cannon that day in
August 1972, he probably had no intention to make legal history-he undoubtedly only wanted to make his net 200 feet away.
And when he brought his suit for appropriation of professional
property, he probably had no intention to clarify the first amendment's role in right of publicity cases-he wanted his money.
As of June 1977 he has achieved all these things-except, as
far as can be ascertained, his goal of money.lgO
190. The case was reversed. 97 S. Ct. at 2859. Negotiations between counsel or further
judicial proceedings will be necessary before the human cannonball reaches his target of
hard cash.

